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1 Introduction
In recent years mobile communication has surpassed all expectations.
Availability virtually everywhere in Europe, increasingly favorable prices and
world-wide service speak for themselves. Mobile voice communication has
become a mass product.
GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) is the best known and most
widely used mobile communication standard. It is a European development,
which has also found global acceptance. Unfortunately, the advance of
security standards has not kept pace with the dissemination of mobile com-
munication.
In spite of this, the security functions which prevent eavesdropping and
unauthorized use are emphasized by the mobile phone companies.
Frequently (almost always), the fact that encryption is restricted to the radio
transmission is concealed. Disputes between a user and the mobile phone
company concerning billing cannot be resolved on a formal basis (e.g. digital
signatures of the billing data).
The existing mobile communication networks are not safer than the fixed
telephone networks. They only offer protection against the new forms of abuse
which arise as a result of mobility.
1.1 What data does the mobile user create?
In their advertisements, the network carriers do not talk about the data
collected and processed. However, the user leaves behind a large trail of
private data:
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1. As soon as the mobile phone is switched on, it registers with the network
carrier. The identity of the user (international mobile subscriber identity,
IMSI, respectively temporary mobile subscriber identity, TMSI), the serial
number of the mobile phone and data concerning the current location is
transmitted to network internal databases (home location register, HLR,
and visitor location register, VLR).
2. Regardless of whether the user is actually making a call or not, the stored
location data is updated from time to time (periodic location updating) in
order to check the reachability of the mobile phone. When leaving the
current location area a location update is necessary, in order to be able to
continue to connect calls to the mobile user. This signaling of location
updates is transparent to the mobile user, i.e. he does not know when it
happens.1 Table 1 gives an overview of typical updating intervals.
network carrier country periodic location updating time constant
D1
D2
E+
ITINERIS
MERCURY
SPRINT
SWISSCOM
Germany
Germany
Germany
France
England
USA
Swiss
6 hours
4 hours
12 hours
6 minutes
30 minutes to 4 hours
30 minutes
2 hours
see http://www.ii-mel.com/interception/mobile_tracegb.htm
3. Each attempted call to a mobile phone is logged and stored by the network
carrier, regardless of whether a connection was established or not.
4. The security protocols which have been implemented (encryption,
authentication, authorization check) can be „broken“ (e.g. with the IMSI
Table 1. Typical periods
for periodical location
updating
1 To check when a (periodically) location updating request is sent by the mobile
phone, the user can place his mobile phone very close to a portable transistor receiver
and wait until a typical noise („tzzz“) is audible.
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Catcher, c.f. section 2.1 or as a result of implementation weakness) –
without having to break the underlying cryptography.
Some of the data mentioned above is needed for the functionality of the
network, for example the current location; other measures are aimed at
repairing malfunctions, for instance, the transmission of the serial numbers of
mobile phones.
In order to ensure the interoperability of the equipment from different
manufacturers, network carriers and service providers, many mechanisms and
protocols have been defined in national, European and international
standards. One of these standards is GSM [ETSI_93]. However, if one wants a
concrete answer to the question of which data is stored by a network carrier
for how long, examining these standards alone is not sufficient. One example
is the „backup“ of locations. Table 2 gives an overview of how long different
network carriers store the locations of their mobile users. From a technical
point of view there is no reason to store a „history“ of locations permanently
or for a long time. For purposes of optimization locations only need to be
stored temporarily during the optimization process.
network carrier country „history“ of locations stored
D1
D2
E+
ITINERIS
MERCURY
SFR
SPRINT
SWISSCOM
Germany
Germany
Germany
France
England
France
USA
Swiss
–
2 days
2 days
–
–
15 days
–
7 days
see http://www.ii-mel.com/interception/mobile_tracegb.htm
Table 2. „Backup“ time of
locations
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1.2 Security functions of the GSM
As background to a better understanding of the attacks on the GSM network
which are described later, the following gives a brief introduction to the
security functions available in GSM. The following functions exist:
• access control by means of a personal smart card (called subscriber
identity module, SIM) and PIN (personal identification number),
• authentication of the users towards the network carrier and generation of
a session key in order to prevent abuse.
• encryption of communication on the radio interface, i.e. between mobile
station and base station,
• concealing the users‘ identity on the radio interface, i.e. a temporary valid
identity code (TMSI) is used for the identification of a mobile user instead
of the IMSI.
The cryptographic algorithms which are used to generate and change the
TMSI and  for encryption and authentication are kept secret (and, in part,
remain secret). They are based on symmetric cryptography, i.e. both the
network carrier and the mobile user (more precisely, the user‘s smart card)
share a secret key Ki (unique for each user). All security parameters
(encryption key, authentication data) are derived from Ki.
Fig. 1 shows the interaction of the security functions using the example of a
location update, without describing it in detail. [MoPa_92], for example,
contains a detailed presentation of the security functions and protocols of
GSM.
2 Security problems and known attacks on GSM
We now describe some known security problems and attacks on GSM. The
IMSI Catcher described in section 2.1 discloses the identities of all users within
a radio cell, while the attackers described in sections 2.2 and 2.3 attempt to
make phone calls at the expense of other users. Section 2.4 describes which
data is collected for billing.
The security problems and their solutions concerning the protection of
locations are introduced in section 3.
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Fig. 1. Use of the security
functions of GSM
(simplified)
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2.1 IMSI Catcher
The name of the IMSI Catcher refers to the abbreviation for the network-
internal call number IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity). By
directly utilizing „weaknesses“ in the authentication protocols of GSM, it is
possible to determine the IMSIs of all users of a radio cell, i.e. the target of an
attacker is to determine the identities of mobile users.
The IMSI Catcher is even capable of signaling to the mobile phone that it
should discontinue using encryption on the radio link, i.e. between the mobile
phone and the base stations.
The type of attack which the IMSI Catcher launches is very simple and is
referred to as a man-in-the-middle-attack. It behaves like a base station
towards the mobile phone and  in relation to the „genuine“ base station of the
network carrier it behaves like a mobile phone (see Fig. 2).
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Such an attack could have been easily prevented if in place of a one-sided au-
thentication (the mobile phone only authenticates to the network carrier, see
Fig. 1) mutual authentication (both users to network and network to users)
had been used. Unfortunately, the GSM standard only defines a one-sided
authentication.
The technical expenditure for the use of mutual authentication would have
been only slightly higher.
knows
identities
suppress
ciphering
MS IMSI Catcher network
Location Upd. Request (TMSI)
Identity Request
Identity Response (IMSI)
Note: The IMSI Catcher
sends its “location area
identity” with a higher
power than the genuine
network.
Location Upd. Request (IMSI)
Authentication Request (RAND)
Authentication Response (SRES)
Ciph. Mode Cmd. (Start Ciph.)
Ciphering Mode Complete (Fault)
Location Updating Accept
TMSI Reallocation Complete
Authentication Request (RAND)
Authentication Response (SRES)
TMSI Realloc. Cmd. (TMSI new)
Ciph. Mode Cmd. (No Ciphering)
Location Updating Accept
TMSI Reallocation Complete
TMSI Realloc. Cmd. (TMSI new)
Ciph. Mode Cmd. (No Ciphering)
BCCHBCCH
2.2 SIM Cloning
In addition to the monitoring of users described in the preceding section, the
question arises of whether it is possible to make unauthorized phone calls at
someone else‘s expense. The challenge-response authentication of GSM (see
Fig. 2. Catching of IMSIs
and suppression of
encryption
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Fig. 1) is intended to prevent this abuse. Unfortunately, the specifications of
the cryptographic algorithms are not public. However, documents related to
an algorithm COMP128 have been made available. COMP128 implements
both A3 and A8. It is published in the Internet, e.g. under
http://www.scard.org/gsm/a3a8.txt. After some weaknesses of COMP128 were
discovered, the following attack was possible. The attacker has to be in the
possession of the smart card and the PIN of the mobile user, at whose expense
he wants to make phone calls, for a short time. The attack is executed offline,
i.e. without communication to the GSM network. The secret key Ki can be
determined after approximately 150,000 requests to the smart card. As a result,
it is then possible for the attacker to provide the correct response (SRES)
online to the challenge (RAND).
It would now be possible for the attacker to make a „copy“ of the smart card.
This attack was revealed by Marc Brienco (Smart Card Developers Asso-
ciation), Ian Goldberg and Dave Wagner (both University of California,
Berkeley) and is published in the Internet under http://www.isaac.cs.berke-
ley.edu/isaac/gsm.html.
It may have been possible to avoid the attack if the algorithm had been
published and reviewed by the security community.
Depending on the smart card reader and computer which are used, at present
the attack takes about 8 to 12 hours to perform. Since the attack is based on a
weakness of COMP128, it only works with smart cards of operators who use
exactly this algorithm. A list of operators, who do not use COMP128, can be
found in the Internet under http://www.scard.org/gsm/.
2.3 Interception of authentication data
It is not possible to make calls at the expense of others with the attack
described above exclusively with information intercepted from the radio
interface. In the following attack described in [Ande_97], however, this is
possible.2
2 The motivation for Anderson‘s efforts was the advertisement of a service provider,
which offered to transfer 10,000 DM to a non-profit organisation, if someone
succeeded in making phone calls at the expense of a certain GSM call number. The
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Many network carriers connect their base stations by (non-public) radio links.
The goal of this procedure is to communicate as much as possible via their
own communication links in order to decrease costs. These radio links are
usually not encrypted.
If a user registers (location updating) at a base station, he is requested to au-
thenticate himself. The network then creates authentication information
(called authentication triple RAND, SRES, Kc) from the individual Ki. The cre-
ation of this data is processed in the authentication center, located at the
home network operator (see Fig. 1). Since the challenge-response authentica-
tion protocol is processed in the mobile switching center which is being
visited, the authentication triple has to be transmitted from the home network
operator to the visited network operator. If the authentication triple is trans-
mitted over a (usually) un-encrypted radio link, an attacker can eavesdrop and
record the information. In the actual authentication request the attacker only
needs to answer (respond) to the RAND with the SRES he has just intercepted
and he will be authenticated.
2.4 Billing and privacy
As long as the processing of data is the responsibility of one operator alone, he
will be able to make his own decisions to a large extent. Otherwise, legal
regulations (e.g. privacy laws) apply. A billing record in GSM contains at least
the following data:
• number of the subscriber who made the call,
• number of the subscriber called,
• location identifier consisting of the switching center, location area and cell
identifier,
• trunk group (the physical line, through which the switching center
connects the call),
• serial number and type of the mobile terminal used,
• beginning, end, duration of the call,
appropriate smart card was deposited with a lawyer. By the time the described attack
was published, the service provider had already withdrawn the advertisement.
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• cause for the termination of the call (e.g. normal end, interference, recog-
nition of a stolen device, failure of a network component),
• volume of transmitted data (data services only).
At the billing center the billing records have to be sorted and attached to the
appropriate user. It is important that the billing data also contains the location
identifiers of a connection. Thus, the subsequent localization of users is
possible.
Since the periodic messages for location updating can lead to an increased sig-
naling load in the mobile network, the creation of so-called „location updat-
ing records“ is intended for billing purposes — at least technically. A location
updating record contains the old and new location of the user, as well as the
appropriate time. Such a location updating record is ideally suitable for the
monitoring and tracking of users.
A possible means of preventing the collection of data is the use of pre-paid
mobile phone cards. Pre-paid phone cards are not supported directly by GSM,
although appropriate offers from network carriers are available. However, they
operate with shadow accounts on the basis of a pre-paid amount. Such cards
cannot be bought anonymously (at least not in Germany).
Unfortunately, no functions are implemented in GSM which guarantee the
user that the invoice is correct. In a dispute the user is has to depend on the
fair trading practices of the network carrier.
3 Movement profiles and their prevention
Generally — as a result of the spread of mobile communication — we can
assume that the ability to observe users, i.e. who said or did what and when,
will be expanded by the question „where?“.
It is frequently claimed that the network carrier needs to know, where a user is
currently located, since incoming (i.e. mobile terminating) calls have to be
connected to the current location of the user.
However, in normal operation the creation of movement profiles (i.e. perma-
nent location tracking) should be prevented. According to legal regulations,
creating movement profiles is prohibited, although it is technically possible.
The user should be able to decide to whom he wants to entrust his data.
Hannes Federrath: Protection in Mobile Communications
10
Even if a user wants to protect himself from tracking by the network carrier, all
existing mobile communication networks prevent this. Since the locations of
the users are stored, the network carrier can access the data at any time and
create movement profiles.
There are occasions, however, when the localization of users can be quite
helpful or even life-saving, e.g. in case of an accident.
3.1 Administration of locations
Normally, a network carrier is not primarily interested in collecting data about
his users, in order to abuse this data. On the contrary, the less data which is
required to provide a service, the lower costs for processing and, particularly,
for protection are.
1. Broadcast method
Avoidance of location data storage and broadcasting (paging) of call requests over the entire
area supplied by the mobile network.
2. Group pseudonyms  [KFJP_96]
A group of individual users is summarized under a common group pseudonym. The
locations of individual users are anonymous within the group.
3. Explicit trustworthy storage of locations
Storing of location data in a trustworthy environment under the control of each mobile user
(e.g. a box or a smart card in a special telephone plug socket, attached to the fixed telephone
of the user) or with help of a trusted third party (trust center).
4. Temporary pseudonyms (TP method) [KeFo_95, KFJP_96]
Storing of location data in the network, however under a temporary changing pseudonym,
and linking of the pseudonym with the identity via a trustworthy environment. This
procedure is based on explicit trustworthy storage (see 3.), however, it is more efficient.
5. Co-operating chips  [Fede_99]
Storing of location data in tamper-resistant hardware, e.g. a smart card, which is the coun-
terpart to the smart card in the mobile phone. This method can be combined with explicit
trustworthy storage (see 3.) and temporary pseudonyms (see 4.).
6. Mobile Communication-MIXing [FeJP_96, Fede_99]
Storing of locations in the network protected with cryptography. Additionally, this
procedure prevents the monitoring and observation of calls.
Table 3. Procedures for
the prevention of
movement profiles
(selection)
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The procedures presented in Table 3 avoid the processing of location data by
the network carrier — without restricting the user in his mobility.
The most important concepts in these procedures are:
• Pseudonyms are used as registration numbers of users instead of identities
(call numbers).
• Tamper-resistant, trustworthy devices for the storage of confidential data
(in particular locations) are used instead of location databases.
• Concepts for the protection of traffic data, e.g. MIXes, are used.
• Special addressing mechanisms, so-called implicit addresses, are used.
3.2 Basic concepts and procedures
In the following we describe a selection of the basic concepts and procedures
introduced in section 3.1. For a detailed description of all procedures see the
original publications [KeFo_95, KFJP_96,  FeJP_95] or [Fede_99].
GSM – no protection of locations
To reach a mobile user (e.g. with an incoming call) the network carrier stores
the location of mobile users in data bases (HLR and VLR). When an incoming
call arrives for a mobile user the network carrier requests the data bases for the
current location of the user (see Fig. 3a).
Since all data base entries are stored under the identity (ID, concretely the call
number) of the user, movement profiles can be created by the network carrier
very easily — simply by continuously looking up the data bases.
Explicit trustworthy storage – secure but high costs
We assume that a user wants to protect himself by using a trustworthy
environment (Table 3, item 3) in the fixed network and storing his locations
directly there (see Fig. 3b). If, however, he is located far away from his home
residence (more precisely, home location area), e.g. on another continent, in
extreme cases the current location identifier will have to be signaled over long
distances of the fixed network. This incurs high costs.
In order to deal with this situation, in GSM the location data base is divided.
One part of the data base is located in the home residence of the user (home
location register, HLR), the other part of the location information is created
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and stored in the area being visited (visitor location register, VLR). A VLR
serves a large area, therefore, only a change of the VLR area has to be signaled
to the HLR. Cell changes are signaled to the VLR without signaling to the HLR.
b) Explicit trustworthy storage of locations
incoming call
ID --> cell
ID ID
individual
trustwothy
environment
of user “ID”
c) TP method
incoming call
ID --> P(t)
ID P(t)
individual
trustwothy
environment
of user “ID”
Visitor
Location
Register
P(t) --> cell
d) Mobile Communication-MIXing
incoming call
Visitor
Location
Register
Home
Location
Register
ID --> f(P2(t)) P2(t) --> f(P1(t))
ID P1(t)
MIXes MIXes
a) GSM - no protection
incoming call
database
request
Visitor
Location
Register
database
request
Home
Location
Register
ID --> VLR
ID --> location
area (cell)ID ID
Pseudonyms in mobile communication
Pseudonyms are used as registration numbers for users instead of identities
(call numbers). They work as a linking feature between users and their actions
— without disclosing the identity of the user. They are adaptable to the degree
Fig. 3. Connection estab-
lishment a) with GSM, b)
with explicit trustworthy
storage, c) with the TP
method, d) with the
Mobile Communication
MIXing
Hannes Federrath: Protection in Mobile Communications
13
of anonymity desired by a user. For a general overview about the usage and
variants of pseudonyms see [PWP_90, PfWa_87].
Pseudonyms for the protection of locations appear to all participants
(including the network carrier) like random numbers. Only the user who
wants to protect his location knows the association between his identity and
his pseudonym.
The TP method [KeFo_95, KFJP_96] (temporary pseudonyms, Table 3, item 4)
makes use of such pseudonyms.
TP method
In the TP method (see Fig. 3c) the locations are no longer stored under the ID
but under a changing pseudonym P(t). Each change of location is registered
under a new pseudonym, and the old one automatically expires after a certain
time. Since the pseudonym cannot be linked to a call number, not even by the
network carrier, no movement profiles can be generated.
When an incoming call arrives the network carrier requests the trustworthy
environment for its current pseudonym, then requests the data bases for the
location of the pseudonym P(t) and routes the call to the visiting cell.
In the TP method cell changes need not be announced to the trustworthy
environment. The synchronization of the pseudonyms is only checked from
time to time (i.e. in the range of minutes to hours) From a technical point of
view, especially in the trustworthy environment, this creates problems. It
could impair availability, since the user cannot be reached if his trustworthy
area has „crashed“ or has been directly attacked.
Mobile Communication-MIXing
It would be desirable to achieve the protection of the location without an indi-
vidual trustworthy environment. Mobile Communication-MIXing [FeJP_96]
(Fig. 3d) offers a solution for this. Special computers, so called MIXes, are
switched into the communication line.
The concept of MIXes was introduced for the first time in 1981 by David
Chaum [Chau_81]. Chaum's concept was developed for E-Mail, and is,  un-
fortunately, not directly applicable for connection oriented communication.
Therefore, adaptations of the basic MIX concept were introduced. In
[PfPW_91] a modification for the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)
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was introduced. Mobile Communication-MIXing is an additional adaptation
in order to apply it in mobile communication networks.
MIXes conceal the relationship between incoming and outgoing messages.3
MIXes must be implemented, installed and operated independently from the
network carrier. Usually, several MIXes are switched in series. Thus, an at-
tacker must either control all MIXes (i.e. crack them) or he must have fed all
messages to the system himself, in order to unmask a certain communication
relationship.
Implicit addressing for the protection of the recipient
None of the suggested methods for the protection of the location work
properly if the identity (call number or other personal identifiers) is
transmitted during the paging procedure. In GSM a temporary valid paging
code, the temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI), is transmitted. It is
used to prevent localization through the interception of the radio signals.
If the user wants to protect himself from localization by the network carrier, a
so-called implicit address has to be used in place of the TMSI. Implicit
addresses enable the user, and only the user, to detect a message intended for
him (e.g. connection requests and incoming calls). Implicit addresses are
generated with cryptographic procedures.
4 The „costs“ of additional security
The question of the expenditure of such location protection arises, since the
development of mobile phones and mobile computing technology is still
3 MIXes store incoming messages until sufficient messages from sufficient different
senders are available, change their appearance (i.e. coding) and change the order
(resorting) of outgoing messages. The kernel function of a MIX is the change of
message coding. It is based on public key cryptography, e.g. on the well-known RSA
encryption system. In order to prevent attacks by re-sending (replay) of messages,
MIXes have to check at the first whether a certain message has already been mixed. In
order to prevent attacks by linking of incoming and outgoing messages by means of
their length, all incoming messages should have the same length, likewise all outgoing
messages.
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going on. The Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) is one
development for the next (referred to as „3rd“) generation of mobile com-
munication.
The bottleneck of a mobile radio system is the air interface. Thus, it is worth
discussing the expansion of the message length of the new procedures in
comparison to GSM. In Fig. 4 the typical message lengths for establishing
communication in GSM, the TP method and Mobile Communication-MIXing
(MC-MIXing) are shown and compared. A detailed assessment of all
procedures can be found in [Fede_99].
0
2000 bit
4000 bit
6000 bit
8000 bit
Reference: GSM TP method MC-MIXing
2776
1536
2144
1520
8008
3624
including mutual
authentication
In the TP method the additional expenditure for protection is relatively
insignificant, however, it introduces high expenditure in advance, since each
user has to purchase a „trustworthy box“, which is installed, for example, to
his fixed telephone socket at home. In addition, there are costs for the „re-
routing“ of each call to the mobile user.
With Mobile Communication-MIXing there is no additional expenditure for
the box (or the additional costs for re-routing), but the public key encryption
procedures which are applied to calls from and to the mobile phone result in
higher expenditure. Initially, this large expansion of the messages may appear
to be a serious problem. However, if we take into account the fact that this
public key encryption will be standardly applied in 3rd generation mobile
networks, the expansion becomes relative. Note, that in the GSM no pubic key
cryptography is used.
Fig. 4. Message lengths or
- intervals of the con-
nection establishment
messages
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5 What will the future bring? — UMTS!
With its modular structure UMTS is already suitable for supporting concepts
such as those which have been described. Three parts, i.e. the components ac-
cess network, the intelligent network and the core (or fixed) network, are con-
sidered appropriate as the architectural base for UMTS [Mitt_94] (see Fig. 5).
Mobile Terminal
Intelligent Network
Core Network Access Network
According to this architecture, the fast and flexible implementation of new
services is achieved by the concept of the intelligent network. The mobility
functions (e.g. location registration and location update) are also implemen-
ted. The core network is realized by means of broadband ISDN (B-ISDN). The
interface to the mobile user forms a special access network, which is coupled
directly to the B-ISDN. Thus, UMTS is no longer „the“ mobile network, but a
„network of networks“.
In order to be able to use the variety of services and transmission techniques
offered, the development of a multi-functional personal communication ter-
minal (personal Communicator for so-called „terminal mobility“) is necessary.
It combines all the mobility options in one terminal. Additionally, UMTS will
provide multi-functional terminals installed at a wide range of (public) places
in order to facilitate  so-called „personal mobility“.
The Universal Mobile Telecommunication System has to unite and combine
the existing mobile radio networks (GSM, cordless systems, paging services,
etc.) within a common platform. UMTS supports new services with higher
data rates, better speech quality and even the capability for multimedia
services. However, no special features which would allow users to protect their
Fig. 5. The architectural
concept of UMTS
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location information are planned. Thus, the question arises of whether UMTS
still offers options for the installation of the procedures described above.
Unfortunately, no strong preventive measures against the creation of move-
ment profiles have been designated in the standardization of UMTS. To a
certain extent the situation has even  been intensified, in contrast to the GSM,
by the introduction of so-called advanced location management procedures
with the aim of increasing efficiency. As long as the standardization process
for UMTS remains open, there are still opportunities to define appropriate
location protection functions. The installation of appropriate security
functions after standardization has been completed would result in higher
costs and unnecessary compromises.
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